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Synopsis

This specification document describes a client (verification algorithm) for a solo machine with a single updateable public key which implements the ICS 2 interface.

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Motivation

Solo machines — which might be devices such as phones, browsers, or laptops — might like to interface with other machines & replicated ledgers which speak IBC, and they can do so through the uniform client interface. Solo machine clients are roughly analogous to “implicit accounts” and can be used in lieu of “regular transactions” on a ledger, allowing all transactions to work through the unified interface of IBC.

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Definitions

Functions & terms are as defined in ICS 2. getCommitmentPrefix is as defined in ICS 24. removePrefix is as defined in ICS 23.

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Desired properties

This specification must satisfy the client interface defined in ICS 2. Conceptually, we assume “big table of signatures in the universe” - that signatures produced are public - and incorporate replay protection accordingly.

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Technical specification

This specification contains implementations for all of the functions defined by ICS 2.

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Client state

The ClientState of a solo machine consists of the sequence number and a boolean indicating whether or not the client is frozen. 
interface ClientState {
  sequence: uint64
  frozen: boolean
  consensusState: ConsensusState
}

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Consensus state

The ConsensusState of a solo machine consists of the current public key, current diversifier, and timestamp. The diversifier is an arbitrary string, chosen when the client is created, designed to allow the same public key to be re-used across different solo machine clients (potentially on different chains) without being considered misbehaviour. 
interface ConsensusState {
  publicKey: PublicKey
  diversifier: string
  timestamp: uint64
}

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Height

The Height of a solo machine is just a uint64, with the usual comparison operations.

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Headers

Headers must only be provided by a solo machine when the machine wishes to update the public key or diversifier. 
interface Header {
  sequence: uint64 // deprecated
  timestamp: uint64
  signature: Signature
  newPublicKey: PublicKey
  newDiversifier: string
}
Header implements the ClientMessage interface.

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Signature verification

The solomachine public key must sign over the following struct: 
interface SignBytes {
  sequence: uint64
  timestamp: uint64  
  diversifier: string
  path: []byte
  data: []byte
}

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Misbehaviour

Misbehaviour for solo machines consists of a sequence and two signatures over different messages at that sequence. 
interface SignatureAndData {
  sig: Signature
  path: []byte
  data: []byte
  timestamp: Timestamp
}

interface Misbehaviour {
  sequence: uint64
  signatureOne: SignatureAndData
  signatureTwo: SignatureAndData
}
Misbehaviour implements the ClientMessage interface.

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Signatures

Signatures are provided in the Proof field of client state verification functions. They include data & a timestamp, which must also be signed over. 
interface Signature {
  data: []byte
  timestamp: uint64
}

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Client initialisation

The solo machine client initialise function starts an unfrozen client with the initial consensus state. 
function initialise(identifier: Identifier, clientState: ClientState, consensusState: ConsensusState) {
  assert(clientState.consensusState === consensusState)

  provableStore.set("clients/{identifier}/clientState", clientState)
  provableStore.set("clients/{identifier}/consensusStates/{height}", consensusState)
}
The solo machine client latestClientHeight function returns the latest sequence. 
function latestClientHeight(clientState: ClientState): uint64 {
  return clientState.sequence
}

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Validity predicate

The solo machine client verifyClientMessage function checks that the currently registered public key signed over the client message at the expected sequence with the current diversifier included in the client message. If the client message is an update, then it must be the current sequence. If the client message is misbehaviour then it must be the sequence of the misbehaviour. 
function verifyClientMessage(clientMsg: ClientMessage) {
  switch typeof(ClientMessage) {
    case Header:
      verifyHeader(clientMessage)
    // misbehaviour only supported for current public key and diversifier on solomachine
    case Misbehaviour:
      verifyMisbehaviour(clientMessage)
  }
}

function verifyHeader(header: header) {
  clientState = provableStore.get("clients/{clientMsg.identifier}/clientState")
  assert(header.timestamp >= clientstate.consensusState.timestamp)
  headerData = {
    newPubKey: header.newPubKey,
    newDiversifier: header.newDiversifier,
  }
  signBytes = SignBytes(
    sequence: clientState.sequence,
    timestamp: header.timestamp,
    diversifier: clientState.consensusState.diversifier,
    path: []byte{"solomachine:header"},
    value: marshal(headerData)
  )
  assert(checkSignature(cs.consensusState.publicKey, signBytes, header.signature))
}

function verifyMisbehaviour(misbehaviour: Misbehaviour) {
  clientState = provableStore.get("clients/{clientMsg.identifier}/clientState")
  s1 = misbehaviour.signatureOne
  s2 = misbehaviour.signatureTwo
  pubkey = clientState.consensusState.publicKey
  diversifier = clientState.consensusState.diversifier
  // assert that the signatures validate and that they are different
  sigBytes1 = SignBytes(
    sequence: misbehaviour.sequence,
    timestamp: s1.timestamp,
    diversifier: diversifier,
    path: s1.path,
    data: s1.data
  )
  sigBytes2 = SignBytes(
    sequence: misbehaviour.sequence,
    timestamp: s2.timestamp,
    diversifier: diversifier,
    path: s2.path,
    data: s2.data
  )
  // either the path or data must be different in order for the misbehaviour to be valid
  assert(s1.path != s2.path || s1.data != s2.data)
  assert(checkSignature(pubkey, sigBytes1, misbehaviour.signatureOne.signature))
  assert(checkSignature(pubkey, sigBytes2, misbehaviour.signatureTwo.signature))
}

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Misbehaviour predicate

Since misbehaviour is checked in verifyClientMessage, if the client message is of type Misbehaviour then we return true: 
function checkForMisbehaviour(clientMessage: ClientMessage): bool {
  switch typeof(ClientMessage) {
  case Misbehaviour:
    return true
  }
  return false
}

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Update functions

Function updateState updates the solo machine ConsensusState values using the provided client message header: 
function updateState(clientMessage: ClientMessage) {
  clientState = provableStore.get("clients/{clientMsg.identifier}/clientState")
  header = Header(clientMessage)
  clientState.consensusState.publicKey = header.newPubKey
  clientState.consensusState.diversifier = header.newDiversifier
  clientState.consensusState.timestamp = header.timestamp
  clientState.sequence++
  provableStore.set("clients/{clientMsg.identifier}/clientState", clientState)
}
Function updateStateOnMisbehaviour updates the function after receiving valid misbehaviour: 
function updateStateOnMisbehaviour(clientMessage: ClientMessage) {
  clientState = provableStore.get("clients/{clientMsg.identifier}/clientState")
  // freeze the client
  clientState.frozen = true
  provableStore.set("clients/{clientMsg.identifier}/clientState", clientState)
}

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State verification functions

All solo machine client state verification functions simply check a signature, which must be provided by the solo machine. 
function verifyMembership(
  clientState: ClientState,
  // provided height is unnecessary for solomachine
  // since clientState maintains the expected sequence
  height: uint64,
  // delayPeriod is unsupported on solomachines
  // thus these fields are ignored
  delayTimePeriod: uint64,
  delayBlockPeriod: uint64,
  proof: CommitmentProof,
  path: CommitmentPath,
  value: []byte
): Error {
  // the expected sequence used in the signature
  abortTransactionUnless(!clientState.frozen)
  abortTransactionUnless(proof.timestamp >= clientState.consensusState.timestamp)

  // path is prefixed with the store prefix of the commitment proof
  // e.g. in ibc-go implementation this is "ibc"
  // since solomachines do not use multi-stores, the prefix needs 
  // to be removed from the path to retrieve the correct key in the
  // solomachine store
  unprefixedPath = removePrefix(getCommitmentPrefix(), path)
  signBytes = SignBytes(
    sequence: clientState.sequence,
    timestamp: proof.timestamp,
    diversifier: clientState.consensusState.diversifier,
    path: unprefixedPath,
    data: value,
  )
  proven = checkSignature(clientState.consensusState.publicKey, signBytes, proof.sig)
  if !proven {
    return error
  }

  // increment sequence on each verification to provide
  // replay protection
  clientState.sequence++
  clientState.consensusState.timestamp = proof.timestamp
  // unlike other clients, we must set the client state here because we
  // mutate the clientState (increment sequence and set timestamp)
  // thus the verification methods are stateful for the solomachine
  // in order to prevent replay attacks
  provableStore.set("clients/{identifier}/clientState", clientState)
  return nil
}

function verifyNonMembership(
  clientState: ClientState,
  // provided height is unnecessary for solomachine
  // since clientState maintains the expected sequence
  height: uint64,
  // delayPeriod is unsupported on solomachines
  // thus these fields are ignored
  delayTimePeriod: uint64,
  delayBlockPeriod: uint64,
  proof: CommitmentProof,
  path: CommitmentPath
): Error {
  abortTransactionUnless(!clientState.frozen)
  abortTransactionUnless(proof.timestamp >= clientState.consensusState.timestamp)

  // path is prefixed with the store prefix of the commitment proof
  // e.g. in ibc-go implementation this is "ibc"
  // since solomachines do not use multi-stores, the prefix needs 
  // to be removed from the path to retrieve the correct key in the
  // solomachine store
  unprefixedPath = removePrefix(getCommitmentPrefix(), path)
  signBytes = SignBytes(
    sequence: clientState.sequence,
    timestamp: proof.timestamp,
    diversifier: clientState.consensusState.diversifier,
    path: unprefixedPath,
    data: nil,
  )
  proven = checkSignature(clientState.consensusState.publicKey, signBytes, proof.sig)
  if !proven {
    return error
  }

  // increment sequence on each verification to provide
  // replay protection
  clientState.sequence++
  clientState.consensusState.timestamp = proof.timestamp
  // unlike other clients, we must set the client state here because we
  // mutate the clientState (increment sequence and set timestamp)
  // thus the verification methods are stateful for the solomachine
  // in order to prevent replay attacks
  provableStore.set("clients/{identifier}/clientState", clientState)
  return nil
}

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Properties & invariants

Instantiates the interface defined in ICS 2.

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Backwards compatibility

Not applicable.

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Forwards compatibility

Not applicable. Alterations to the client verification algorithm will require a new client standard.

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Example implementations

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History

December 9th, 2019 - Initial version December 17th, 2019 - Final first draft August 15th, 2022 - Changes to align with 02-client-refactor in #813 September 14th, 2022 - Changes to align with changes in #4429 All content herein is licensed under Apache 2.0.